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Eastern policy has for many years been a complicated and 
emotionally charged issue in Polish-German relations. A frequent 
claim made in public debates on this issue is that the two countries 
are once more divided in their views. However, the results 
of a survey conducted simultaneously by the Institute of Public 
Affairs and the Bertelsmann Stiftung in Poland and Germany reveal 
that Poles and Germans hold basically similar views on issues 
connected with the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Although differences 
between them are visible, the two countries are closer to each 
other in their opinions on Russia than many Polish and German 
commentators assume. Poles and Germans share the same negative 
assessment of the state of their countries’ relations with Russia. 
Also both publics support EU sanctions.  Moreover, they are willing 
to support Ukraine economically but would not like to see further 
deterioration of relations with Russia. As for Russians, they also 
regard their country’s relations with Poland and Germany as bad. 
Despite the fact that they view the conflict from a completely 
different perspective than Poles and Germans,  a clear majority 
of Russians do not support any military engagement of Russia 
on the side of the separatists in eastern Ukraine.
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Key findings
Opinions of Poles and Germans
 Poles and Germans are not as divided regarding their opinions on relations 
with Russia and the conflict in Ukraine as conventional wisdom suggests. At 
the same time there are quite significant differences of opinion within both 
societies.
 Poles and Germans assess the state of the relations between their countries 
and Russia similarly. More than three-fourths of the respondents think the 
relations are bad (78%).
 Poles and Germans also share the opinion that it is not Ukraine that is 
responsible for the conflict. However, while a clear majority of Poles believe 
the responsibility lies with Russia (61%), Germans are here divided with a 
comparable group of 39% blaming Russia and 43% seeing responsibility on 
both sides of the conflict.
 Poles and Germans differ somewhat when it comes to the assessment of the 
military threat posed by Russia to their country. While Poles are convinced 
that Russia is a threat to Poland (76%), with only 14% not seeing a threat, half 
of Germans (51%) do not perceive any military threat from Russia, and 41% 
do see a threat.
 German society is divided in their opinions of whether Russia exerts 
economic pressure on their country. Such pressure is acknowledged by 44%, 
while 46% do not see it.
 Poles are much more critical of the Polish government’s policy regarding the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict than the Germans are concerning their government’s 
policy. Only one in four Poles positively assesses the activities of the Polish 
government, while more than the half of the Polish respondents have a 
negative opinion (51%). In the case of the German survey, it is exactly the 
other way round, with 53% positive assessments and 39% negative ones. In 
both cases among the critics of their government’s policy are both those 
who think the policy should be stronger as well those who think it should be 
less tough on Russia.
 Poles assess the policy of the German government regarding the crisis 
more negatively than positively and worse than the Germans themselves . 
The percentage of the German positive opinions on their country’s policy is 
nearly twice as high as the Polish opinion regarding Germany’s policy (53% 
to 28%).
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 When asked whether their countries have common or different interests in 
their policy towards Russia, both publics are very divided in themselves. As 
compared to 2013, fewer people in Poland and Germany are convinced that 
their countries share the same interests. Germans are considerably more 
convinced about both countries’ common interests towards Russia than are 
Poles (48% to 32%). The plurality of respondents in Poland (46%) doubt that 
both countries have common interests, while in Germany such skepticism is 
shared by just one third (34%) of the respondents.  
 In both countries there is little support for easing the sanctions against 
Russia. The majority of Poles and Germans favour either strengthening 
the sanctions or keepting them at the present level. Still the percentage of 
Germans who favour easing and strengthening the sanctions is exactly the 
same (23% each) while in Poland five times more respondents would opt for 
tougher sanctions then for reducing them. 
 Poles and Germans want to support Ukraine economically (56% and 55% 
respectively), whereas both publics are opposed to providing military 
assistance for Ukrainian army.  By the same token, both societies are 
reluctant to endorse assistance for Ukraine if this would lead to further 
worsening of relations with Russia. 
 A substantive majority of Germans (70%) and plurality of Poles (45%) oppose 
the lifting of EU visa requirements for Ukrainians, while 30% of Poles and 
only 17 per cent of Germans are in favour of visa liberalization for Ukraine.
Opinions of Russians
 The Poles and Germans are not alone in opposing Russia’s involvement in 
the conflict in Ukraine. Amongst Russians themselves, Russia’s involvement 
in the conflict on the side of the separatists in the Donbas region has less 
support than neutrality.
 Only 7% of Russians think that Russia should send its armed forces to 
Ukraine to assist the separatists. 
 Russians almost unanimously assess the current state of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations as bad.
 Russians are well aware of the political and economic costs of the current 
Russian policy towards Ukraine – it is leading to a deterioration of relations 
with countries such as Poland and Germany, and the sanctions imposed on 
Russia negatively influence the state of the Russian economy.
 Over half of Russians perceive relations with Poland (67%) and Germany 
(52%) as bad. However, these countries are not perceived as posing a threat 
to Russia. 
 Russians are worried about the United States. Two-thirds of Russians (67%) 
believe that the United States poses a threat to their country.
 7Close together or far apart?
Introduction
In the year that has passed since the annexation of Crimea by Russia, 
the Russia-Ukraine conflict has undergone various phases, mobilizing the 
international community to undertake actions in this matter. Although up 
until now the European Union has managed to work out a common official 
position in relation to Russia and to assess the crisis (as it has developed), it is 
in fact very divided. Some countries are seeking to return to normal relations 
with Russia and do not see a need to continue sanctions. Other countries 
believe that EU policy towards Vladimir Putin must not be softened, and that, 
in case of further violations of agreements by him, more severe measures 
should be taken. The Polish and German governments belong to the latter 
group, yet in both countries, there is a common belief that the Eastern policy 
again strongly divides the two countries. Selective media reports on the other 
country’s (government’s) stance and the omission of the context of quoted 
statements of politicians contribute to such a perception. The result is that 
the general public receive an incomplete picture – and as a consequence 
often form a false impression – of the position of the government and society 
of their neighbour. Following public and expert debates and public opinion 
surveys more closely in both countries allows us to discover that the divisions 
between Poles and Germans are not as great as might be assumed from the 
commentators’ remarks. Differences are rather emerging within each of two 
societies in their assessment of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and of the actions 
that should be taken in response.
In order to test this hypothesis, the Bertelsmann Stiftung and Institute 
of Public Affairs undertook to carry out nearly identical surveys in the two 
countries. Cooperation in formulating questions, the choice of the period of 
the survey, as well as a joint analysis of the survey results allowed us to indicate 
the real similarities and differences in the opinions of Poles and Germans 
concerning the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the policies of our governments 
towards Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, the research allowed us to better 
understand existing differences of attitudes within both our societies, as 
well as to define common areas on which constructive cooperation in the 
European Union can be based. In turn, these findings can help us to work more 
effectively on bringing closer together not only the positions of governments 
or experts, but also those of German and Polish public opinion. 
Given that it is primarily the assessment of Russia’s government policies 
and of the attitudes of Russian society that is considered to divide Poland 
and Germany, we extended the studies by adding a short survey carried 
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out in Russia itself. Including Russians’ answers helped in formulating 
recommendations for joint Polish-German actions in the European arena. 
In interpreting the results of the studies, it is worth paying attention to 
two issues. Firstly, in many cases, there is no clear majority of respondents 
supporting a given point of view or solution in any of the studied societies. 
Usually one point of view or assessment receives a higher proportion of 
affirmative answers than others, but it does not often exceed 50%. Thus we 
often write about the largest groups of respondents who have expressed a 
given opinion – and not about the majority of respondents. For this reason, 
answers to some questions cannot be reduced to a simple “Poles think this, 
and Germans think that” (as surveys in which most respondents subscribe 
to a particular viewpoint are often interpreted). As we pointed out earlier, on 
some issues, divisions within our societies are clearer than the differences in 
opinion between Poles, Germans, and Russians.
Secondly, the time frame when the surveys were carried out is also 
important: in the period after the Minsk II agreement was signed, but before the 
Russian opposition activist, Boris Nemtsov, was murdered. When conducting 
the public opinion survey concerning such dynamic developments, these 
events must have had an impact on the distribution of responses to some 
of the questions, especially on German assessments concerning Russia. In 
our opinion, however, the timing does not affect the general findings from 
the study, which should become a significant element of public debate in 
our countries and of the dialogue of experts and politicians in Germany and 
Poland.
The survey was conducted in Poland by TNS Polska on a representative 
sample of 1000 adult Poles in the period from 13 to 18 February 2015, in Germany 
by TNS EMNID in the period from 13 to 21 February 2015 on a representative 
sample of adult Germans, and in Russia by Lewada Centre on a representative 
sample of 1600 adult Russians in the period from 20 to 24 February 2015 by the 
face-to-face method.
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Polish and German opinions on relations with Russia
and the Russia-Ukraine conflict
Introduction
The misunderstandings1 that are mounting in Polish-German relations 
regarding the Eastern policy and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict are 
focused around several issues. For years, the two societies have differed in 
their assessment of the relations of their respective countries with Russia. In 
the course of the development of the crisis (from the time of the Euromaidan 
protests), Poles and Germans – as could often be heard – have had differences 
of opinion as to who is guilty of stirring up and escalating the conflict (Russia 
or Ukraine), how to react to it (by introducing sanctions and/or supporting 
Ukraine – economically, politically, or militarily), as well as regarding whether 
Russia constitutes a threat. On both sides of the Oder, both neighbours 
criticized each other’s government policies and also sometimes their own. In 
Poland, it was also often suspected that Germany was making decisions under 
pressure from Russia. Asking identical questions in both countries allowed 
us to establish in what respects the two societies indeed differ, and what 
unites them in their views on the events in the east and the policy of their 
governments towards these events.
Many factors, of course, affect respondents’ assessment of mutual relations, 
the crisis, and government policy, including factors linked with demographic 
features and other general characteristics of the given respondent. In the 
case of Germany, answers may differ according to whether the respondent 
comes from east Germany or west Germany, since residents of the former 
German Democratic Republic had a completely different experience with 
Russia and its propaganda than persons from the former Federal Republic of 
Germany. In Poland, on the other hand, it can be assumed that the regional 
breakdown is unlikely to play a role, although a key factor is establishing 
whether a respondent has greater knowledge on political subjects (which can 
be assumed in persons declaring an interest in politics). Poles in general have 
problems with assessing many political issues (the tendency appears in many 
public opinion surveys), and the rather scarce reports from the world arena 
in the Polish media do not give them a chance to develop their own opinions. 
Although news on the Russia-Ukraine conflict is, by Polish journalistic 
1 For more on Polish-German misunderstandings in the assessment of approaches to Eastern policy, see 
A.Łada, Ostpolitik 2014. Fünf Missverständnisse zwischen Deutschen und Polen / Polityka wschodnia 2014. Pięć 
nieporozumień między Polakami a Niemcami (Eastern Policy 2014. Five Misunderstandings between Poles and 
Germans), Institute of Public Affairs and Bertelsmann Foundation, Warsaw/Gütersloh 2014.
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Poles and Germans 
are unanimous in their 
assessment that relations 
between their respective 
countries and Russia are 
bad. Over two-thirds of 
respondents in each country 
say this
Figure 1. 
How would you describe 
the current relations 
between your country and 
Russia? Opinions of Poles 
and Germans 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2013, 2015
standards, accessible and regular, its lack of setting in the broader context of 
international politics changes the perception of audiences.
State of both countries’ relations with Russia
The relations of Poland and Germany with Russia were always very 
different. The development of economic relations, history, cultural contacts, 
and the sort of “infatuation” that Germans have traditionally felt for their 
“Eastern neighbour”, as they used to and still call Russia, have all had an 
influence on the state of these relations.2 These differences have meant that 
for years Germans have generally assessed their relations with Russia as being 
better than Poles have assessed their own relations with Russia. The current 
crisis has caused major changes in these assessments and has drawn Poles 
and Germans closer in their perception of relations with Russia.
Poles and Germans now similarly assess the state of relations between 
their respective countries and Russia. More than three-quarters 
of those asked consider the relations bad (78%). However, in 
Poland, many more people than in Germany claim that the 
state of their country’s relations with Russia is very bad (26% 
compared to 16%). Also, in both countries there is virtually no 
belief that relations are very good (only 1% in Germany and 0% 
in Poland chose this response). However, in Germany, 15% of 
respondents assess relations as rather good, while in Poland 
only 9% chose that response.
2 In Germany, for example, a sort of “Gorbimania” is still prevalent today – a gratitude to the former leader of 
the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, (which has “rubbed off” onto Russia in general) for allowing the reunification of the 
two German halves. For more on the development of Polish-Russian and German-Russian relations, see: J.Kucha-
rczyk, A.Łada, C.Ochmann, Ł.Wenerski, Polityka i życie codzienne. Niemieckie spojrzenie na Polskę i Rosję / Im Osten 
was Neues? Das Bild Polens und Russlands in Deutschland (Politics and Everyday Life. The German View of Poland 
and Russia), Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2013, and G.Gromadzki, J.Kucharczyk, A.Łada, C.Ochmann, Y.Taran, 
Ł.Wenerski, Ludzie – historia – polityka, Polska i Niemcy w oczach Rosjan / Menschen - Geschichte - Politik, Russische 
Ansichten zu Polen und Deutschen (People – history – politics, Poland and Germany in the Eyes of the Russians), 
Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2012.
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Figure 2. 
How would you describe 
the current state of 
relations between Germany 
and Russia? Opinions of 
Germans in 2013 and 
2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2013, 2015
In Poland, persons declaring an interest in politics are particularly strongly 
convinced of the bad state of Polish-Russian relations. In Germany, residents 
of the eastern länder assess the state of relations with Russia worse; 12% of 
them rate these relations positively, compared to 17% from west Germany. 
Such a poor assessment of relations with Russia represents a major change, 
especially in the case of German public opinion. The German assessment of 
German-Russian relations has significantly changed in the last two years. In 
the year 2013, nearly half of respondents believed these relations were very 
or rather good (47%), whilst now this percentage has decreased to 16%. At 
the same time, the group of those assessing relations as bad or very bad has 
grown from 42% to 78%.
In Poland, the attitude towards relations with Russia has usually been 
more critical than in Germany, hence the change is smaller but also noticeable. 
To a similar question asked by Centrum Badania Opinii Publicznej (Center 
for Public Opinion Research) in April 2008 (however, respondents also had 
the choice of an intermediate reply in that survey: “neither good nor bad”), 
somewhat more than one-quarter (27%) of respondents chose the answer that 
the state of relations is bad, in 2009 – 40% chose this answer, in 2011 – 42%, 
and in May 2014 – 65% (in the 2014 survey, 3% of Poles stated that relations are 
good, and 27% neither good nor bad).3
These changes are an evident reaction of both societies to Russian activity 
in Ukraine and Moscow’s aggressive policy as well as to the reluctance on 
Russia’s part to get involved in real cooperation. 
3 CBOS, Polacy o stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich i polityce wschodniej Polski (Poles on Polish-Russian Relations 
and Poland’s Eastern Policy), Research Report no 77/2014, Warsaw, May 2014.
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Figure 3. 
Who is responsible for the 
Russian-Ukrainian conﬂ ict? 
Opinions of Poles and 
Germans in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
Both societies agree that 
it is not Ukraine that is 
responsible for the conflict. 
However, whilst Poles mainly 
ascribe responsibility for 
the crisis to Russia (61%), 
Germans are divided in 
their opinions – 39% see 
responsibility on the Russian 
side, and 43% on both 
sides: the Russian and the 
Ukrainian
Responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict
Poles and Germans also share the opinion that it is not 
Ukraine that is responsible for the conflict. However, while a 
clear majority of Poles believe the responsibility lies with Russia 
(61%), Germans are divided on this issue, with a comparable 
group of 39% blaming Russia and 43% seeing responsibility on 
both sides of the conflict. So, while the percentage of Poles who 
claim the Russian side is solely responsible is ten times higher 
than the percentage believing the Ukrainians are to be blamed 
(61% to 6%), the difference between Germans holding these 
opinions is only four times (39% to 10%). At the same time, twice 
as many Germans as Poles (43% to 20%) see responsibility for 
the conflict on the part of both countries.
However, if we sum up the answers indicating Russia’s 
responsibility and the answers indicating responsibility on both sides, the 
percentages in Germany and Poland are comparable. In total, 81% of Polish 
respondents and 82% of German respondents chose these two answers. 
This is an even better indication that Poles and Germans differ only in their 
assessment of whether Ukraine shares responsibility for the conflict.
In Germany, the perception of Ukrainian responsibility for the conflict 
may be the result of a lack of experts with broader knowledge on the subject 
of Ukraine who could communicate it to the public. Another factor is the 
strong pro-Russian propaganda in Germany, thanks to which, one often hears 
how Ukraine contributed to exacerbating the conflict. However, there is no 
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Poles and Germans differ 
greatly in their assessment 
of the military threat 
that Russia poses to their 
respective countries. 76% of 
Poles and 41% of Germans 
perceive a threat
correlation between opinions as to who is responsible for the conflict and 
assessments of German-Russian relations. 
In Poland, opinions blaming Ukraine in expert or media debates have been 
virtually absent. While there is an awareness that the actions of the Ukrainians 
cannot always be assessed positively, this does not imply perceptions that 
Ukrainian policy has provoked the armed conflict. Respondents who rate 
Polish-Russian relations well constitute an exception. They decidedly more 
often (than respondents in general) perceive responsibility for the conflict on 
the Ukrainian side, and more rarely on the Russian side. Similarly, those Polish 
respondents who rate the state of Polish-Russian relations as bad, more often 
(than the general population) ascribe responsibility to Russia for the outbreak 
of the conflict. 
On the Polish side, persons interested in politics blame Russia particularly 
often. In Germany, inhabitants of east Germany relatively more frequently 
ascribe responsibility to Ukraine (17%, compared to 8% of west Germans). At 
the same time they blame Russia more rarely (29%, compared to 42% west 
Germans). 
Military threat and economic pressure from Russia 
Assigning blame to Russia for the development of the conflict is directly 
linked with the assessment of the extent to which Russia can generally pose 
a military threat. In relation to their country, Poles perceive this question very 
directly, since historically they have often been victims of Russian aggression 
and the activities of Russian armies which have been tragic in their effects, 
even when these troops came into Poland as allies. Although Germany has 
also fought wars with Russia in the past, and Soviet troops were stationed for 
years in the former GDR, experience from the past does not play such a role. 
The voluntary withdrawal of Soviet troops, and above all, the social conditions 
of their stationing in the former GDR are the reason for disbelief that such 
an army is capable of attacking Germany. In the west of the country, on the 
other hand, it is what is often summarily termed “the German pacifists” who 
absolutely refuse to believe that Russia may seek a military solution to the 
conflict.
Hence, Poles and Germans differ somewhat when it comes 
to their assessments of the military threat posed by Russia to 
their country. While Poles are fairly convinced that Russia is a 
threat to Poland (76%), with only 14% not seeing a threat, half 
of the Germans (51%) do not perceive any military threat from 
Russia, whereas 41% do see a threat. The percentage of Poles 
who are strongly convinced such a threat exists is four times 
higher than the percentage of Germans (31% as opposed to 8%).
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Figure 4. 
Does Russia pose a 
military threat to your 
country? Opinions of Poles 
and Germans 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
The percentage of Poles who feel a threat from Russia is very high, but the 
group of Germans who perceive such a threat to their country is also relatively 
large in number. The difference between the percentage of those who perceive 
a threat those who do not see one is relatively small amongst Germans (10 
percentage points). Persons who do not feel a threat probably see the Russia-
Ukraine conflict as local,4 not having an influence on their life, and far from 
the borders of their country. Germans currently – in contrast to Poles – see 
a relatively greater risk elsewhere: in terrorism (about half of Germans fear 
terrorist attacks in Germany5) or the Islamic State. In recent months, articles 
have appeared in the media about German citizens – mainly, but not only, of 
Arab origin – joining groups of supporters of the Islamic State or even joining 
the fight on the side of the Islamic State. The proximity of this problem means 
that other threats, e.g., from Russia, do not seem so serious. Furthermore, 
Germans know decidedly less than Poles about the conflict in the east, since 
media reports on this subject are more modest than in Poland. However, in 
general, international news/features are more common on German television 
and radio, and in the press or on websites than in Poland. The topics raised 
are very varied: for example, besides reports about the situation in Eastern 
Ukraine, conflicts in Africa and the Middle East are also covered. In Poland, if 
foreign issues are raised, news about Russia dominates, as well as, specifically, 
news about the Russia-Ukraine conflict and about Germany.
Furthermore, the fact that Germany does not see a threat from Russia may 
stem from the German pacifist attitude to the world, which has its roots in the 
German history of the last century. This attitude manifests itself in thinking 
along lines such as: Germany does not want to attack anyone and is ready to 
pursue peace at any price, nor does it allow itself to suspect other countries 
4 In the case of the war in Georgia, Germany also perceived the conflict as local, whereas in Poland, it was seen 
as a war and as a threat to European principles.
5 https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend-257.html [retrieved: 27.03.2015].
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of aggressive intentions. Hence, most probably a significant proportion of 
Germans do not allow the thought to enter their heads that some country (in 
this case, Russia) may constitute a military threat to them. 
The specific period of conducting the survey also undoubtedly had an 
impact on the distribution of responses amongst Germans – the survey 
took place before the murder of Boris Nemtsov. The murder of the Russian 
oppositionist had a much greater influence on the internal German discussion 
about security than the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. Since the time of this 
murder, the atmosphere in Germany has changed. Analysing reactions and 
debates, one can especially assume that not only has the picture of Russia 
changed (to that of a country in which political opponents are killed), but 
also the approach to personal safety, which, according to current German 
opinions, is threatened, since Russia is unpredictable. In Poland, this murder 
did not trigger such changes, because Poles had already for some time stopped 
believing in the democratic and peaceful attitude of Russia.
West Germans sense a military threat to Germany from Russia more 
frequently (44%, in comparison to 31% of east Germans). There is also a clear 
correlation between the origin of a respondent from east Germany with a 
more frequent attribution of responsibility for the crisis to Ukraine and less 
sense of threat from Russia. The experiences of east Germans with the Soviet 
Army in the former GDR may influence such assessments. The Soviet Army was 
stationed on their land for several decades, and so they had an opportunity to 
see if it constituted a threat.
In Poland, people interested in politics perceive a threat from Russia 
relatively more frequently, as well as those who above all blame Russia for the 
conflict, and assess Polish-Russian relations as bad.
Poles’ sense of threat from Russia has evolved over the years, increasing at 
moments when Russia has demonstrated its military power. For example, in 
2006, 59% of respondents feared Russia, and in 2010 – 49%.6 However, shortly 
after the war in Georgia in 2008, 77% of Poles surveyed thought Russia posed a 
military threat to Poland (with 33% agreeing strongly and 44% rather agreeing 
with this opinion). Currently almost identical results are noted.
6 CBOS, Poles on national security and NATO, Research Report no. 48/2014, Warsaw, April 2014.
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Germans are divided in their 
opinions as to whether 
Russia exerts economic 
pressure on their country. 
44% of respondents perceive 
such pressure, 46% do not
Figure 5. 
Does Russia pose a 
military threat to Poland? 
Opinions of Poles in 2005, 
2008 and 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs 2005, 2008 and 
Institute of Public Affairs / 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2015
An important element of German-Russian relations is economic 
cooperation. In 2013, i.e. just before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict, Germany’s trade balance with Russia was over 77 billion euros.7 
German trade contacts were based on the cooperation of many companies, 
including the largest concerns that have factories in Russia. Russia is also an 
important – though not the only – supplier of oil and gas to Germany. These 
links mean that especially in Poland there is a suspicion that German policy 
yields to pressure from business circles for whom the best possible relations 
with Russia are important.
Germans are divided in their opinions as to whether Russia 
exerts economic pressure on their country. Such pressure is 
perceived by 44%, while 46% do not see it. This division shows 
that many people are aware how much the German economy 
is linked with the Russian economy. However, whilst a certain 
percentage of respondents certainly evaluate these links 
negatively, fearing too great Russian influence, others do not 
necessarily assess these influences negatively, as pressure from 
Russia. Probably in this case even more than in the case of other responses, 
the respondents’ opinions depend on their personal situation – for example, 
an indirect or direct link with the Russian economy (e.g., through work for a 
German firm exporting to Russia).
7 In the same year, the trade balance with Poland was 78.5 billion euros. In 2014 the trade balance with Russia 
was 67.7 billion euros and with Poland 87.3 billion euros, which, in the case of relations with Russia, is a drop of 
12%, and, in the case of Poland, an increase of 11.2%. See: Deutscher Handel mit Mittel- und Osteuropa, Statisti-
sches Bundesamt / bearbeitet Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft.
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Poles critically assess 
the actions of their own 
government in relation to the 
conflict (51%). The opinions of 
Germans on the conduct of 
the federal government are, 
on the other hand, mostly 
positive (53%)
Figure 6. 
Does Russia exert 
economic pressure on 
Germany? Opinions of 
Germans in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
Polish and German government policy regarding the conflict
The assessments of the two societies concerning Russian responsibility 
for the conflict and Russian economic influence shape expectations that 
citizens have of the actions of their respective government in the face of the 
existing conflict. In this case, however, opinions are also influenced by internal 
political and cultural factors, as well as economic interests.
Poles are much more critical of the Polish government’s policy regarding 
the Russia-Ukraine conflict than Germans are of their government’s policy. 
Only every fourth Pole assesses the activities of the Polish government 
positively, while more than half of Polish respondents have a 
negative opinion (51%). In the case of the German respondents, 
it is the other way round, with 53% positive assessments and 
39% negative ones. Both in Poland and in Germany, in the group 
of critics of the policies of their respective governments, there 
are doubtlessly those who regard government involvement in 
the solution of the conflict as too great and too small: those 
who would wish more pro-Russian activities, and those would 
like even severer policies towards Moscow.
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Figure 7. 
How do you assess the 
policy of your government 
regarding the Russia-
Ukraine conﬂ ict? Opinions 
of Poles and Germans in 
2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
This thesis is confirmed by juxtaposing answers to this question with 
opinions on the subject of responsibility for the conflict. Persons blaming both 
sides of the conflict for the crisis rate the activity of the Polish government 
in this field decidedly more negatively. In this case, it may be assumed that 
these persons consider government policy as too pro-Ukrainian or anti-
Russian. However, Poles who ascribe responsibility to Russia, relatively more 
frequently (than respondents in general) speak positively about the activities 
of the Polish government with respect to the conflict, although even in this 
group there is a significant percentage of critics of the government, who – as 
may be supposed – would like a more decisive reaction to Moscow’s activities.
In Germany there is also a correlation between opinions on the subject 
of the policies of the federal government in the matter of the crisis and 
assumptions regarding the party responsible for its outbreak. Respondents 
who positively assess the activities of the German authorities more often 
point to the guilt of Russia in the conflict (51% of them – compared to 39% 
of respondents in general – blame Russia), and those who criticize the 
government are keener to ascribe responsibility to both countries (51%, 
compared to 43% of respondents in general). This confirms the hypothesis that 
at least some of the people who criticize the government consider its policy 
towards Russia as too severe. At the same time, every fourth advocate of the 
hypothesis that Russia is responsible for the conflict criticizes the policy of 
their own government, probably for not being severe enough towards the 
aggressor.
The differences in assessments of government policies between the two 
societies might be partly explained by the different political cultures in the 
two countries. Poles are generally quite pessimistic and negatively (and very 
emotionally) oriented when it comes to their own politicians. For example, 
in the same survey, only every fourth respondent positively assessed the 
general work of the government, while two-thirds of respondents had a 
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negative opinion on this subject. Moreover, Polish political debates are very 
confrontational, and even regarding security issues there is no consensus 
among the main political parties. However, neither belonging to the 
electorates of particular political parties nor the degree of interest in politics 
significantly differentiates assessments of government policy concerning the 
conflict (although supporters of both PiS and SLD somewhat more frequently 
criticize the government for its Eastern policy). However, correlations are 
already clearly perceptible in the case of opinions on the subject of the work 
of the government. Persons giving the government generally good ratings, 
relatively more frequently have a positive attitude to its policy in the Russia-
Ukraine conflict: 42% of people who rate the government highly also positively 
assess its activities towards the crisis, whilst 55% of respondents who have 
a negative opinion of the government also negatively perceive its activity in 
the face of the conflict. Similarly, those who speak negatively about the state 
of Russian-Polish relations have a negative opinion (about the government’s 
approach to the conflict) relatively more frequently than respondents in 
general.
Germans generally rate the policy of their government highly. In a survey 
conducted in February by ARD Deutschlandtrend, 57% of respondents 
expressed satisfaction with the work of the government. Germany is currently 
governed by a Grand Coalition, which means that the government is supported 
by a relatively large number of people – supporters of the two largest parties. 
Hence, answers to the question about opinions on the activities of the 
government undertaken in the face of the Russia-Ukraine conflict are more 
relevant in the case of Germany because they are not burdened by the general 
criticism towards coalition politicians, as in the case of Poland. Also, the 
policy responses to the crisis are drawn up both by the Christian Democratic 
Chancellor and the Social Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs, which may 
increase the number of supporters of the policy.
Germans supporting the policy of their government are undoubtedly 
divided into two groups. One of these groups contains people who are 
satisfied with a policy direction that is not endeavouring to intensify the 
conflict. The generally pacifist attitude of German public opinion means that 
Germans prefer peaceful solutions, making use of the power of dialogue – and 
the German government is currently applying such solutions. Hence west 
Germans relatively more frequently than east Germans assess government 
policy positively (54% and 46% respectively), since it is precisely in these 
(western) areas that the pacifist tradition has been promoted in the last 
decades. However, some Germans may perceive Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
policy as determined rather than confrontational – standing firmly on the 
side of sanctions. This government approach also meets with the support of 
persons who perceive Russia as being responsible for the conflict and want to 
maintain or increase sanctions. 
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A similar percentage 
of respondents in both 
countries have a negative 
opinion of German 
government policy 
concerning the conflict. 
At the same time, almost 
two times more Germans 
than Poles assess German 
government policy in this 
context positively
Figure 8. 
How do you assess the 
policies of the German 
federal government 
regarding the Russia-
Ukraine conﬂ ict? Opinions 
of Poles and Germans 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
Observing the Polish public debates on the crisis and 
the involvement of other countries, especially Germany, one 
might have the impression that Poles are very critical towards 
Germany’s engagement in the conflict. Indeed, the survey 
shows that Poles assess the policy of the German government 
regarding the crisis more negatively than positively, and rate 
it worse than Germans themselves do. The percentage of 
German positive opinions on their country’s policy is nearly 
twice as high as Polish opinions regarding Germany’s policy 
(53% to 28%). However, the percentage of negative opinions 
in both countries is very comparable. At the same time, every 
third Polish respondent cannot give an answer to this question. 
Three-quarters of Polish respondents hold identical (in both cases positive or 
in both cases negative) opinions about the activities of the Polish and German 
governments. 
In the case of Poles’ assessments of the actions of the German government, 
the negative opinions most probably signify a conviction that Berlin is doing 
too little to resolve the conflict, and that its actions are too pro-Russian or 
too soft on Russia. Such an interpretation may seem justified if one takes into 
account the numerous Polish media reports in which Germany is accused of 
too soft an approach to Vladimir Putin’s policies. In reality, however, often 
this interpretation is based on statements of former German politicians who 
today, neither play an important role in the German public debate nor have 
any influence on decisions made by the government. Polish listeners also 
often misunderstand statements of members of the German government, 
who – for domestic political purposes – use different rhetoric to that used in 
Poland, but convey a message that is substantively similar to Poland’s stance.8 
8 A.Łada, Ostpolitik, Op.cit.
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Figure 9. 
How strong is the inﬂ uence 
of the Russian government 
on the policies of your 
government? Opinions of 
Poles and Germans 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
In this context, the small number of respondents who rate German policy 
highly is not surprising. Such an interpretation is also confirmed by the fact 
that positive opinions are held more often (than by respondents in general) 
by persons who declare an interest in politics and who are thus – it may be 
supposed – also better informed about the German position. Finally, negative 
assessments of German actions may be linked with traditional Polish fears 
about German dominance in Europe and its consequences for Poland. Actions 
undertaken by Merkel together with the French president, but without the 
participation of leaders of other countries, including Poland, were strongly 
criticised in Warsaw. The leading role of Germany in the European reaction 
to the conflict in the East is in Poland perceived precisely as a symptom of 
the general strengthening of Germany’s position in the EU. Poles, meanwhile, 
do not agree whether the strengthening of the German position in Europe is 
beneficial for Poland or not.9 
Russian influence on Polish and German policy 
Opinions on the governments’ policies towards the conflict are linked 
with debates on the subject of Russian influence exerted on given countries. 
The actions of the pro-Russian lobby as well as direct economic links with 
Russia mean that the actions of a given government may be considered – to 
a greater or lesser extent – to have been undertaken under the influence of 
pressure from Moscow. Different experiences resulting from Poland’s and 
Germany’s long relations with Russia, the strength of links with Russia, and 
the intensity of propaganda mean that Poles and Germans differ in their 
assessment of Russia’s influence on their countries’ policies. Half of the Poles 
9 38% of Polish respondents are convinced of the benefits, whereas 35% of respondents consider that it would 
be neither beneficial nor detrimental for Poland. 17% of respondents see disadvantages. See: A.Łada, Barometr 
Polska – Niemcy 2015. Polacy o polsko-niemieckim partnerstwie we wspólnej Europie / Deutsch-polnisches Ba-
rometer 2015. Polnische Ansichten zur deutsch-polnischen Partnerschaft im gemeinsamen Europa (Poland-Ger-
many Barometer 2015. Poles on the Polish-German Partnership in a Common Europe), Institute of Public Affairs, 
Warsaw 2015
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taking part in the survey think the influence of the Russian government on the 
policy of the Polish government is strong (49%), while only 33% of Germans 
see such an influence on their country’s government. Twice as many Germans 
as Poles do not believe in such a strong influence (54% to 27%). There is also a 
significantly large group of Poles – every fourth respondent – who do not have 
any opinion on this question (24%).
As in the case of assessments of government policy, a significant fraction 
of respondents who are convinced about the influence of the Russian 
government on Polish policy are supporters of stronger action against Russia. 
And likewise, two-thirds of advocates of imparting military aid to Ukraine 
are convinced about such an influence. Similarly, critics of government 
policy are more frequently convinced about the influence of Russians on this 
policy. There is thus a statistically significant correlation between criticism 
of government policy, a conviction about Russia’s influence on this policy, 
and support for more decisive action supporting Ukraine against Russian 
aggression. A strong influence is also perceived relatively more frequently by 
those who see Russia as a military threat to Poland.
In Germany, there is the same correlation as in Poland – respondents who 
perceive a military threat to their country from Russia also see the influence 
of the Russian government on German government policy relatively more 
frequently than respondents in general. Residents of west Germany (35%) 
perceive a strong Russian influence on the German government relatively 
more frequently than residents of east Germany (29%). 
In Poland, there is a common opinion in public debates that Germany is 
under Russian pressure because of their strong economic ties and Russian 
propaganda activities in the country. Indeed, survey results show that 39% 
of Poles asked about this issue believe the Russian government has a strong 
influence on German policy. Still, that number does not differ very much 
from the percentage of Germans (33%) claiming so, and is smaller than the 
percentage of Poles observing a strong Russian influence on the Polish 
government. It is also comparable with the number of those who think 
Russia’s influence on the German government is weak. However, the number 
of Poles who do not perceive such an influence on the German government is 
much smaller than the number of Germans expressing this opinion.
Respondents from Poland who perceive a strong Russian influence on the 
German government are more likely (52%, compared to 40% of all respondents) 
to negatively assess German government policy towards the conflict. 
In conclusion, there is a significant (but not a majority) group amongst 
the Polish public that is convinced that Russia influences the policies of 
the German government, but at the same time – which may be something 
of a surprise – many more Poles are convinced about such an influence on 
government policy in Warsaw.
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Figure 10. 
How strong is the 
inﬂ uence of the Russian 
government on the policies 
of the German federal 
government? Opinions of 
Poles and Germans 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Foundation 2015
Poles less often than 
Germans perceive common 
Polish-German interests in 
policy towards Russia
Differences of interests in Eastern policy 
Eastern policy has nearly always been perceived as dividing Poland and 
Germany. Poles mention it as one of the main problems in current Polish-
German relations.10 In recent years, Polish and German public opinion have 
drawn closer, and the two governments have conducted policies that are 
more and more along the same lines. This has been noticed by both societies, 
which in 2013 claimed that Poland and Germany have common interests in 
their policy towards Russia. In that year, 43% of Poles and 52% of Germans 
surveyed shared this opinion. Since then, the situation has changed. Polish 
and German public opinion have drifted apart and they no longer seem to 
perceive a common voice in their government policies.
Germans are more convinced about their countries’ common interests 
with Poland vis-à-vis Russia than are Poles (48% to 32%). The largest share of 
respondents in Poland (46%) does not believe that the countries have common 
interests, while in Germany this opinion is held by a smaller share of those 
sampled (34%). However, in both countries the percentage 
of such sentiments has increased (in Poland by 4 percentage 
points; in Germany by 9), while the group of respondents 
believing in common interests has noticeably decreased (in 
Poland by 11 percentage points; in Germany by 10 percentage 
points).
10 A.Łada, Barometr Polska-Niemcy 2015 / Deutsch-Polnisches Barometer 2015 (Poland-Germany Barometer 
2015). Op.cit
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Polish scepticism concerning common interests in the Eastern policy stems 
from several reasons. This issue has traditionally divided Poles and Germans. 
Therefore, when faced with media reports that emphasise these differences, 
Poles are inclined to believe in the lack of Polish-German agreement in this 
area. However, persons interested in politics see the countries’ common 
interests relatively more frequently than respondents in general – probably 
due to greater knowledge about the positions and cooperation of both 
countries. The low assessment is also a consequence of omitting Poland from 
the talks conducted with representatives of Russia and Ukraine. The so-called 
Normandy format was received very negatively in Poland as a symbol of 
Poland’s exclusion from activities in an area directly linked with its interests. 
Both of the western countries leading the talks were simultaneously accused 
in Polish debates of taking a too soft stance towards Moscow and yielding to 
its wishes, which is regarded as contrary to the Polish approach to the conflict. 
Hence the drop in the percentage of Poles perceiving Polish-German common 
interests.
The absence of Poland during talks in the Normandy format greatly 
agitated and polarized Polish discussions on ways of solving the conflict. 
Many commentators considered the absence of Poland at the table as a defeat 
for Polish Eastern and European policy and as evidence of the divergence of 
Polish and German views. This is confirmed by the strong correlations between 
responses concerning common interests and assessments of the activities of 
the Polish government concerning the conflict. Most Poles who positively 
assess government policy are convinced of Polish-German closeness in the 
matter of Russia (68% compared to 32% of all respondents). In turn, 69% 
(compared to 46% of all respondents) of those giving the government a 
negative rating in its current Eastern policy consider the countries’ interests 
Figure 11. 
Do Poland and Germany 
have common or divergent 
interests in their policy 
towards Russia? Opinions 
of Poles and Germans in 
2013 and 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs 2013 as well as 
Institute of Public Affairs/ 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2013, 2015
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Poles and Germans are 
against reducing sanctions 
against Russia
as divergent. However, there is no significant correlation between the 
assessment of common policies of both countries and assessment of the 
influence of Russian authorities on the policy of the German government.
In turn in Germany, the general public, as already mentioned, are less 
knowledgeable about the development of events in the east of Ukraine and 
about the situation in that region. Additionally, the public knows relatively 
little about the Polish stance in the matter of the conflict, since generally 
Germans’ knowledge about Poland is not great, and media reports about 
Polish policy are currently meagre. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict, Poland is rarely mentioned. If it is mentioned, it is usually depicted as 
a country seeking to radically toughen policy towards Russia. Here common 
interests can be perceived by those Germans who are also in favour of a 
tough policy towards Russia and are counting on the fact that Germany will 
be supported in such a stance by other countries. Persons who scrupulously 
follow government policy and are interested in Poland may understand 
that in fact Warsaw and Berlin are close to each other in eastern matters. It 
is precisely these respondents who constitute the group claiming that both 
countries have decidedly common interests (16%), which has increased 
significantly since the last survey.
Expected reactions to the crisis
Although – as we have already noted – many Poles believe that Poland and 
Germany are greatly divided when it comes to what policy to adopt towards 
Russia, the survey shows there is only limited support for reducing sanctions 
against Russia in both countries. The majority of both Poles and Germans 
favour other solutions: either introducing stiffer sanctions or maintaining 
them at their present level. However, the percentage of Germans who are in 
favour of easing sanctions is exactly the same as it is for those strengthening 
economic measures against Russia (23% each), while nearly seven times more 
Polish respondents would opt to strengthen sanctions against Russia rather 
than ease them. In the German case, the largest group of respondents would 
like the sanctions to be kept as they are (44%), while the largest 
group of respondents in Poland wants to strengthen them 
(41%). Four times as many German respondents as Polish ones 
are keen to ease the sanctions. 
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The position of both societies on this issue is influenced by numerous 
factors. A number of economic groups advocate lifting or moderating 
sanctions, however, there is far less support for reduced sanctions in Poland 
than in Germany. According to data from the Committee on Eastern European 
Economic Relations (Ostausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft), Germany’s 
balance of trade with Russia was down by 12% in 2014 in relation to 2013. 
Exports to Russia shrank by 18%.11 Such exports accounted for around 2.6% of 
total German overseas trade in 2014, which is down by 0.6 percentage points 
in relation to 2013. By way of comparison, German exports to the EU make up 
approximately 58% of the country’s total exports.12 Meanwhile, in Poland’s 
case, it is estimated that despite their negative effects, the sanctions have 
not hit the economy particularly hard. Polish exports to Russia have dipped 
by around one percentage point, falling from 5.3% to 4.3% of total overseas 
trade. By way of comparison Polish exports to EU countries account for 77% of 
the country’s overall exports.13 In both Germany’s and Poland’s case, exports 
have suffered as a result of the West’s sanctions against Russia and the latter’s 
counter-sanctions, as well as from the general problems affecting the Russian 
economy stemming from, among other factors, falling petroleum prices on 
world markets.
Attitudes towards the sanctions are also influenced by Russian 
propaganda, which is, as currently even many German media outlets admit, 
a powerful force in Germany (for example, the vast number of pro-Russian 
comments drafted by Russian propagandists that can be found under texts 
11 While sanctions are not the only reason for this result, they are often the most stressed factor. Deutscher 
Handel mit Mittel- und Osteuropa, Statistisches Bundesamt / bearbeitet Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft.
12 Statistisches Bundesamt, Zusammenfassende Übersichten für den Außenhandel (Vorläufige Ergebnisse), 
Fachserie 7 Reihe 1, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 2015.
13 Central Statistical Office of Poland, Foreign Trade in General and By Country I – XII 2015, Preliminary results, 
Warsaw, 11.02.2015.
Figure 12. 
Should the current 
sanctions imposed by the 
European Union against 
Russia be strengthened, 
kept as they are, or eased? 
Opinions of Poles and 
Germans in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
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on many websites). In addition, many of those voicing an opinion on this issue, 
especially on the radio or television, are calling for sanctions to be eased. The 
very timing of the survey itself has also affected the answers given, coming as 
it did just after the conclusion of the Minsk II agreement, which in Germany 
had raised hopes of an end to the conflict. By contrast, few people in Poland 
believe there will be a positive turnaround in the situation and there is greater 
support in the country for stepping up sanctions or maintaining them at 
their current levels. The mood clearly changed in Germany after the murder 
of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, which came as a shock to the German 
public and made many people reflect on the need for a tougher stance against 
Russia. As was mentioned above, in Poland’s case, the murder of the regime’s 
leading critic only reinforced the view that Russia is a country in which there 
is little respect for the rule of law. Hence, the crime did not have such a great 
impact on Poles’ attitudes, including with regard to the sanctions. 
In Poland, support for tougher sanctions was stronger than average 
among people who said they were interested in politics, who assessed Polish-
Russian relations as poor, who had a positive view of the Polish government’s 
policy on the crisis, who believed that Russia was solely responsible for the 
crisis, and who regarded that country as a military threat.
In percentage terms, support among Germans for tougher sanctions was 
comparable in both the east and west of the country. When it came to the 
question of easing sanctions or keeping them as they are, the respondents 
were more polarised in their views. More respondents in the east of the 
country than in the west were in favour of easing sanctions (36% compared 
with 19%, respectively), and were less keen on maintaining the status quo 
(34% compared with 46%, respectively). Furthermore, among respondents 
who had a negative view of the German government’s policy on the conflict 
in Ukraine, significant regional differences were also evident. More people in 
the east of the country support the idea of easing sanctions than in the west 
(54% compared with 31%, respectively). Moreover, fewer people in the east are 
favourably inclined towards keeping sanctions as they are (23% as opposed to 
39% in the west).
On the other hand, in the east of the country no correlation was observed 
between respondents’ opinions on German-Russian relations and their views 
on the future of sanctions. However, the views of respondents living in the 
west of the country regarding the character of such relations was significant: 
while most respondents admittedly prefer to keep the status quo, a high 
percentage of those who viewed relations with Russia as bad want stiffer 
sanctions (27% compared with 13% of those who view relations with Russia 
positively).
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Support for Ukraine
Besides actions against Russia, government policy on the 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine also includes measures aimed at 
providing support for Ukraine. This approach may take a variety 
of forms – ranging from economic and political steps to military 
action.
Poles and Germans are united in their belief that their countries should 
provide economic assistance to Ukraine (56% and 55%). Still, the percentage of 
Germans who are against such assistance is 11 percentage points higher than 
the percentage of Poles. There are twice as many Poles supporting the idea of 
economic aid as there are opposed to such assistance. 
In view of the fact that Poles regard Russia as clearly to blame for the 
conflict, and that the public debate in Poland – in terms of statements made 
by politicians and experts in the media – very much leans towards Ukraine, 
with many expressing solidarity with it, the fact that 56% of respondents 
favour economic support should not come as a surprise. In this context, it is 
worth noting that the Polish public is generally conservative when it comes 
to helping others. Poles still perceive themselves as a developing country 
that cannot afford major financial commitments to countries in need. In 
addition, since Poles’ knowledge of foreign policy is relatively limited, they 
are often unable to accurately assess how much aid is needed. People who in 
the survey admitted having little interest in politics were as a result unable to 
say whether Ukraine should receive support or not. In turn, when we compare 
the questions about Poles’ support for their eastern neighbour and how they 
view the state of the Polish economy, a correlation can be seen between 
respondents’ desire to provide Ukraine with help and their assessment of the 
country’s economic situation. Those Poles who believe the Polish economy is 
growing are more willing to provide Ukraine with economic assistance. Also, 
Poles and Germans expressed 
similar levels of support for 
providing economic aid to 
Ukraine
Figure 13. 
Should your country 
provide economic 
assistance to Ukraine? 
Opinions of Poles and 
Germans in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
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Neither Poles nor Germans 
want to provide Ukraine with 
military aid
Figure 14. 
Should your country 
provide assistance to 
the Ukrainian army, for 
instance, by supplying 
equipment, weapons, or 
military training? Opinions 
of Poles and Germans 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
those respondents who have a positive view of both the government’s overall 
policy and its actions in relation to the Russia-Ukraine conflict are more 
inclined to support the idea of Polish economic aid for Ukraine. Respondents 
who blame Russia for the conflict and perceive that country as a military 
threat are relatively more likely to hold this view than respondents as a whole.
As the strongest economy in Europe, Germany is a country which often 
helps others in need. Germany provides a relatively high level of development 
aid and boasts a variety of advanced aid systems. On the one hand, aid for 
poor countries is regarded as a moral obligation, but on the other, it is seen 
as an ever increasing burden. The country’s current willingness to provide 
economic help also stems from the fact that in the context of the present 
financial crisis in the European Union, opinions voicing the need to help 
others have been heard very frequently in Germany. Just as in the case of the 
Poles, those Germans who believe that Russia is responsible for the crisis and 
who also support the federal government’s policy on the conflict are relatively 
more keen on providing aid than respondents as a whole. Those respondents 
who back the idea of stiffer sanctions or leaving them at their present level are 
also more in favour of supporting Ukraine (economically). 
On the other hand, neither Poles (56%) nor Germans 
(82%) want to send military support to help Ukraine. Military 
assistance is backed by one in every four Poles surveyed (25%) 
and by only one in every ten German respondents (10%).
The reasons for this response vary somewhat, depending on the country. 
Poles, fearing the military threat posed by Russia, do not want to aggravate 
the conflict and provoke Russia (“don’t poke the bear”). However, this attitude 
is also probably due to their reluctance to bear the financial costs of such an 
operation. Such support is opposed more often than not by those respondents 
who expressed an interest in politics, who have a negative view both of 
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As many Poles (37%) as 
Germans (36%) are in favour 
of helping Ukraine, even if 
it is at the cost of damaging 
relations with Russia
Poland’s relations with Russia and the Polish government’s policy on the 
conflict, and also – which is important – perceive Russia as a military threat. 
Those who think both sides are responsible for the conflict also do not favour 
this form of support.
Among Polish respondents who expressed an opinion on possible 
economic and military support for Ukraine (760 out of 1000 respondents), 30% 
were in favour of both types of aid and 32% were against providing any form of 
assistance, while 36% were positively inclined towards the idea of economic 
help, but were against any military aid. Two percent of respondents support 
the idea of military aid alone.
In turn, Germans are for the most part against the idea of sending military 
personnel or weapons outside the country. Bearing in mind the pacifism of 
the Germans (as was mentioned earlier), their perception of the conflict as a 
local problem, and their focussing to a similar extent on other threats, they do 
not see a need to commit any resources of their country to operations that are 
– even only partly – military in character. Their reluctance to provoke Russia, 
however, certainly plays an important role in their answers to this question. 
On the other hand, differences between the east and west of the country are 
also evident here.
However, those German respondents who mainly blame Russia for the 
conflict are more often inclined than respondents in general to support the 
idea of sending military aid to Ukraine (18%, compared to 10% overall).
Among German respondents who express an opinion on both economic 
and military aid (854 out of 1000 respondents), 10% support both types of 
action, 41% are against either form, 47% are in favour of economic aid, but 
opposed to military assistance, and 2% favour providing purely military aid.
Any support given to Ukraine, regardless of whether it is economic or 
military in nature, can be perceived by Russia in different ways, so we can 
expect mainly critical or even downright aggressive reactions. In particular, 
support for the Ukrainian army may be seen as a provocation. Respondents 
are aware of this risk. When asked about whether their country should still 
support Ukraine even at the risk of worsening relations with Russia, a little over 
one-third of the respondents in each country were decidedly in 
favour of such an idea. The percentages are very similar in both 
countries. More than one-third of both Poles (37%) and Germans 
(36%) share the opinion that their country should support 
Ukraine even if this results in a deterioration in relations with 
Russia. However, half of all the German respondents are against 
such support (51%), while in Poland both groups – supporters 
and opponents – are of comparable size. Poles are somewhat divided in this 
respect, and it is noteworthy that every fourth Pole has no opinion on this 
issue. 
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Poles who feel that Russia poses a military threat are more willing to help 
Ukraine even at the price of worsening relations with Moscow (42%, compared 
to 24% of those who do not feel that Russia poses a military threat). Also, those 
who regard Russia as primarily responsible for the conflict look favourably 
upon the idea of providing aid even if it risks further damaging relations with 
Russia – most probably because they see relations between the countries as 
already being very poor. And indeed, respondents with negative perceptions 
of Polish-Russian relations are on average more willing to support Ukraine. 
Such support is expressed relatively more frequently by those who have a 
positive view of the Polish government’s actions in relation to the conflict. 
Just as in Poland, those Germans who blame Russia for the conflict 
are more willing to risk further damaging relations with Russia by lending 
assistance to Ukraine. Also, those who feel Russia poses a military threat are 
more frequently willing to support Ukraine, even at the cost of worsening 
relations with Russia (43%, compared to 34% of those who feel that Russia 
poses no military threat). 
In both countries, a positive correlation exists between supporting 
Ukraine despite the negative consequences it could have for relations with 
Russia and support for sanctions and economic or military aid. Those people 
who support the idea of providing aid in general are more inclined to support 
stiffer sanctions, economic help, and providing the Ukrainian army with aid 
than those people who are against assisting Ukraine. 
When considering why so many Poles and Germans are against providing 
Ukraine with assistance if it provokes Russia, it is crucial to bear in mind the 
general debate going on in both countries on how Ukraine should be helped. 
Figure 15. 
Should your country 
support Ukraine during 
the Russian-Ukrainian 
conﬂ ict even if it leads to 
a deterioration in relations 
between your country and 
Russia? Opinions of Poles 
and Germans 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
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The majority of Germans 
and the largest group of 
Polish respondents are 
against abolishing visas for 
Ukrainians
Figure 16. 
Should the European Union 
abolish visa requirements 
for Ukrainians? Opinions of 
Poles and Germans 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
Some respondents may have understood “support” to mean direct military 
support, which is rejected by the majority (see the question above). 
One way of expressing political support for Ukraine, which at the same 
time would send a very real and concrete signal to the Ukrainian people, is 
for the EU to abolish visas for Ukrainians. Poles and Germans 
generally share similar views on abolishing visas for Ukrainian 
citizens. Large numbers of respondents in both countries are 
against the idea. However, while in the German case there is a 
clear majority against doing away with visa requirements (70%), 
in Poland only 45% are opposed to this proposal. Although 
fewer Poles support a visa-free regime for Ukrainians (30%) than 
oppose this idea, the percentage is still higher than in the case of Germans 
who would like the visa requirement lifted (17%).
The negative views in both countries towards abolishing visas are surely 
largely due to ignorance in both societies as to what is meant by visa-free 
travel (confirmed, in particular, in the case of the Polish respondents by the 
fact that one in every four was unable to give an opinion on this subject). In 
reality, it ensures Ukrainians easier entry into the European Union as tourists 
or on business for short stays of up to three months. Permission to settle in the 
country or seek employment is an entirely different matter. We can assume 
that the fears of Poles and Germans are due to the possible influx of large 
numbers of Ukrainians demanding asylum (the number of internal refugees 
from regions affected by the conflict in Ukraine stands at over a million). 
Added to this are fears of large numbers of economic migrants on Poland’s 
and Germany’s labour markets. It is surely because of all these factors that 
so many Poles and Germans are opposed to the idea of eliminating visas for 
Ukrainians.
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The idea of doing away with visas is favoured in Poland by those who 
regard Russia as responsible for the conflict as well as by those respondents 
who have a positive view of the Polish government’s policy on the crisis in 
Ukraine. In addition, the idea of abolishing visas is backed decidedly more 
frequently (than by other respondents) by those who consider that Ukraine 
should receive aid even at the cost of worsening relations with Russia.
The attitude of Germans is probably influenced by the many debates in 
that country on the subject of immigrants (currently these debates focus 
particularly on immigrants from Kosovo, who do not need a visa, and refugees 
coming from the Southern Mediterranean due to the conflicts in this region), 
the settlement of foreigners in Germany, and their taking up of work there. The 
average German citizen is currently faced with the largest number of refugees 
coming to the country since the war in the Balkans at the beginning of the 
1990s. Allowing Ukrainians visa-free travel is something that thus greatly 
alarms ordinary Germans. Hence, there are no differences in this case among 
Germans regardless of who they believe is guilty of the conflict, their general 
desire to provide help for Ukraine (even at the cost of making relations with 
Russia worse), or whether they are from the east or the west of the country.
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 35Close together or far apart? 
More than half of Russians 
assess relations with 
Germany (52%) and Poland 
(67%) as bad
Russians on relations with Poland and Germany
and the Russia-Ukraine conflict
Introduction
Russia’s policy towards Ukraine – the annexation of Crimea and the role of 
the Kremlin in the conflict in the east of Ukraine – has rendered null and void 
the Polish-German-Russian rapprochement, which had been taking place, for 
example, through the Kaliningrad Triangle initiative. The Polish and German 
governments have defied the Kremlin by supporting Ukraine in the process of 
reforms as well as Ukraine’s right to preserve its territorial integrity. Both the 
Polish and German governments have played a leading role in the imposition 
of EU sanctions to punish the Putin administration for its actions in Ukraine.
Surveys carried out by Moscow’s Levada Center, for example, show 
that the current Russian authorities (especially President Putin personally) 
and their conduct in the international arena enjoy the support of a large 
part of Russian society. The extent to which the citizens identify with the 
Kremlin’s current policy has an influence on how Russians perceive the 
nature of Russia’s relations with other countries, especially the current and 
future policy towards Ukraine. At the same time, the Kremlin propaganda, 
which misrepresents the nature of the conflict and conceals Russian direct 
military involvement, remains crucial for maintaining social support for the 
government.
State of relations with Poland, Germany, and Ukraine 
Most Russians negatively assess the current state of relations with Poland 
and Germany. The percentage of respondents rating relations with Poland as 
bad or very bad is, however, clearly greater than in the case of relations with 
Germany. Two-thirds of respondents (67%) hold this opinion regarding the 
relations with Poland, whereas relations with Germany are perceived as bad 
by only 52% of Russians. 
A clear difference in the assessment of relations between 
Russia and Poland and between Russia and Germany can also 
be seen among respondents who perceive these relations as 
good or very good. One in three (33%) respondents still believes 
that relations between Russia and Germany are positive. In the 
case of Poland, this percentage is only 15%.
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Figure 17.
How would you describe 
the current relations 
between Poland, Germany, 
and Russia? Opinions of 
Russians in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/ Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
Regarding the assessment of Russia’s relations with Poland and Germany, 
the views expressed by residents of Moscow stand out. When assessing 
relations with Germany, residents of Moscow are evenly divided (48% each) 
into those who consider relations as good and those who perceive relations 
with Germany as bad. When it comes to relations with Poland, a quarter of 
the residents in Moscow consider them to be good, and as many as 70% of 
respondents think the opposite. The difference in the responses noted in 
Moscow and the rest of the country are caused by, inter alia, the fact that 
amongst the Muscovites there was a decidedly smaller percentage of people 
who were not able to answer the question about the state of relations between 
Russia and Germany/Poland. In the case of relations with Germany, this 
percentage was 4% (in comparison with 15% of the general population); in the 
case of Poland, it was 5% (in comparison with 18% of the general population).
A comparison of the results of this survey with results of earlier surveys 
shows how significantly the perception of Poland, and even more so of 
Germany, has changed in the eyes of Russians. In the case of the assessment 
of Poland, a comparison with an IPA study published in 201113 is indicative. 
The comparison is not exact because in the 2011 study, respondents – when 
assessing relations with Poland – could also choose to respond that relations 
were “neutral” (“neither good nor bad”). It was precisely this answer that was 
chosen by the majority at the time: 63% of respondents. However, what is 
particularly significant is that in this study, positive answers were indicated 
more often than negative answers. In 2011, the IPA survey revealed that Polish-
Russian relations were regarded as good by 21% of Russians and as bad by 
16%. Changes concerning the perceptions of Russian-German relations stand 
out even more. In 2011, Russian respondents mostly indicated that relations 
13 G. Gromadzki, J. Kucharczyk, A. Łada, C. Ochmann, Y. Taran, Ł. Wenerski, Ludzie – historia – polityka / 
Menschen – Geschichte – Politik. Op.cit.
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 37Close together or far apart? 
Russian society is almost 
unanimous in its assessment 
of relations with its 
neighbour – 88% rate 
Russian-Ukrainian relations 
as bad
with Germany were good. Two-thirds of Russians surveyed (66%) chose such a 
reply, even though it was also possible to choose the answer “neutral”.
It is obvious that in the eyes of Russians the deterioration of relations with 
Poland and Germany was brought about by the countries’ strong opposition 
to the Russian annexation of Crimea and their strong opposition to the current 
Russian policy regarding the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Other factors 
may also have had an impact on the negative assessment of Polish-Russian 
relations, such as the active presence of Poles (including Polish politicians) at 
the Euromaidan, which the Kremlin propaganda presented as an externally 
created movement that led to the fall of the legitimate president and 
government of Ukraine. It can also be noticed that sharp anti-Polish rhetoric 
is omnipresent in the Russian media, where the Poles are often described as 
key allies of the United States in Europe, performing tasks entrusted to them 
by the USA.
Negative assessment regarding relations with Germany may be rooted 
in the awareness of the critical role of Germany in the ongoing debate about 
how Europe should react to Russian policy towards Ukraine. They also reflect 
a general feeling that the events of the last year have undone the many years 
spent building good relations with German partners.
One-third of Russians, as already mentioned, still positively perceive 
Russian-German relations. This group probably includes those who perceive 
Germany as having a significant role not only as a leader in the EU, but also 
as the main mediator on the part of Western countries. In this sense, for 
some Russians Germany seems to be for some Russians a reliable partner 
with whom a compromise can be reached, which cannot be said, for example, 
about such countries as the United States or Poland. What is more, the still 
strong economic ties between many German and Russian business entities 
probably affect this perception of Germany for a part of Russian society. In 
these business relations, politics is often sidelined.
The Euromaidan revolution, the annexation of Crimea, the conflict which is 
now taking place in Eastern Ukraine, and the accompanying tensions between 
the authorities in Kiev and Moscow have a huge influence on how Russians 
perceive their country’s relations with Ukraine. Russian society is almost 
unanimous in its assessment of relations with its neighbour 
– 88% assess Russian-Ukrainian relations as bad. Half of those 
in this group consider these relations to be rather bad, and the 
remainder see them as very bad. Only 5% of respondents are of 
the opposite view (good or very good relations), and 7% were 
unable to give an opinion as to whether relations between 
Russia and Ukraine are good or bad.
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The vast majority of Russians 
consider that neither Poland 
(71%) nor Germany (74%) 
constitutes a threat to Russia
Figure 18. 
How would you describe 
today’s relations between 
Ukraine and Russia? 
Opinions of Russians 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
Figure 19. 
Does the following country 
pose a threat to Russia? 
Opinions of Russians 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs / Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
Although a majority of Russians rate relations with 
Poland and Germany negatively, this does not mean that the 
respondents believe these countries pose a potential threat 
to the security of Russia. Most Russians believe that neither 
Poland (71%) nor Germany (74%) constitutes a threat to Russia. 
Amongst residents of Moscow, this percentage is significantly higher – 85% 
when it comes to Germany, and 79% in the case of Poland. 
At this point, it is worth again citing the IPA survey from 2011 in which 
Russians were asked whether Poland or Germany could in the future pose a 
threat to Russia. In spite of the fact that relations between Russia and these 
countries were at the time perceived as being much better, the percentage 
of persons who perceived a threat was not lower, but very similar to that 
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 39Close together or far apart? 
The largest group of Russians 
(46%) believe that Russia 
should remain neutral in 
the conflict currently being 
waged in Eastern Ukraine
measured in 2015, and amounted to 22% in the case of both countries. So this 
means that the fear of Poland or Germany has not increased over the last 
few years. In the case of both countries, Russian respondents seem to believe 
that these countries are neither willing to get involved in a direct conflict 
with Russia nor do they have the capacity to pose such a threat. Moreover, in 
the case of Germany, the perception of this country as a nation of pacifists, 
opposing their country’s engagement in conflicts in the international arena, 
may also play a significant role. 
Respondents who consider that Poland and Germany pose a threat 
to Russia see relations with these countries as being far worse. Amongst 
people who perceive a threat from Germany, only 14% consider that relations 
between Russia and Germany are good (compared to 33% of all respondents), 
while 77% are of the opposite view (compared to 52% of all respondents). In 
the case of persons who feel a threat from Poland, only 6% are of the opinion 
that Polish-Russian relations are good (compared to 15% of all respondents), 
and 88% perceive them as bad (compared to 68% of all respondents).
If there is a country that could pose a threat to Russia, then it certainly is 
not any of the individual countries of the EU, such as Poland or Germany, or 
even the EU as a whole. In the opinion of respondents, the real danger comes 
from the United States. Two-thirds of respondents (67%) are of the opinion 
that this country constitutes a real threat to Russia, whilst one-quarter (26%) 
of respondents are of the opposite view. The Russians’ responses capture 
the atmosphere that has been created in Russia regarding relations with the 
United States. Kremlin propaganda accuses the United States of conducting an 
imperialistic policy which is in opposition to the strategic interests of Russia, 
and the events that have occurred in Ukraine are presented as a provocation 
both caused and financed by Washington. 
Support for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine
The Russian authorities have been criticised by the European Union, 
the United States, and other countries for their involvement in the conflict 
currently being waged in Eastern Ukraine. The prevailing belief, backed by 
substantial evidence, is that the Russians, albeit unofficially, are sending 
military equipment and troops to territory occupied by the Ukrainian 
separatists. In accordance with the Kremlin’s official line, Russia sees the 
actions of the separatists in Eastern Ukraine as a case of armed resistance 
against an “illegal” regime in Kiev and recognises the right of 
the people in that region to self-determination. At the same 
time, however, it does not admit to being militarily involved in 
the conflict.
As the results of the research show, Russian opinion is divided 
on whether or not the country should support the separatists 
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Figure 20. 
Should Russia support 
the separatists in Eastern 
Ukraine, or should Russia 
remain neutral? Opinions 
of Russians in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
fighting in Eastern Ukraine. The largest group, i.e., almost half of the respondents 
(46%), believe that Russia should remain neutral in the conflict. 
Fewer people (41%) declared a willingness to support the separatists than 
those who favour neutrality (46%). Also, far more women than men are in 
favour of Russia remaining neutral in the conflict. Almost half of the female 
respondents (49%) believe that Russia should not be involved, while 39% are 
of the opinion that support should be given to the separatists. A total of 43% 
of men support neutrality, while 44% are willing to give aid to the separatists.
Those respondents who believed that Russia should support the 
separatists fighting in Eastern Ukraine were then asked what kind of aid 
they believe should be given. This group (41% of all respondents) are almost 
unanimous when it comes to the need for political support – 95% are in favour 
of such backing. More than two-thirds of the respondents in this group also 
believe that Russia should support the separatists by sending them military 
equipment. The older the respondents were, the more likely they were to 
favour these two options. 
However, when all respondents are taken into consideration, less than 
half are in favour of providing aid for those fighting for “Novorossiya” – 39% 
of all respondents are in favour of providing political support, and 28% are 
willing to send military equipment.
The most unpopular option among the respondents is the suggestion 
that the Russian army should directly intervene in Ukraine. Such a solution 
is backed by only 16% of those Russians respondents in favour of providing 
support to the separatists, which translates into just 7% of all respondents. 
The opposite answer definitely prevails - 69% of Russians who do not 
want their country to stay neutral, i.e. 87% of all respondents, are not ready 
to support sending Russian troops to Ukraine. It means that four times more 
Russians who were asked about direct military engagement in Ukraine are 
against it (69%) than support it (16%). Support for direct involvement by 
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 41Close together or far apart? 
Support among Russians for 
direct military involvement 
by the Russian Federation in 
the conflict in Ukraine is very 
low at a mere 7%
Figure 21. 
How should the separatists 
in Eastern Ukraine be 
supported? Opinions of 
Russians in 2015 
(in %, only positive 
answers) 
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
the Russian Federation in the Ukrainian conflict is slight, not only among 
Russians in general, but also among those who want to provide aid to the 
separatists. This is because officially sending Russian troops 
would represent a declaration of war against Ukraine, a step 
that Russians apparently find unacceptable.
The results of this survey thus show that the majority of 
Russians respond to the perceived threat from the outside 
through isolationism rather than willingness to intervene 
militarily in neighbouring countries. Understanding this fact 
helps explain why the Kremlin propaganda goes to such lengths to deny the 
fact of Russian military presence and participation in the fighting in Ukraine.
Impact of sanctions on the Russian economy
The public has been aware of Russia’s worsening economy since the 
autumn of 2014. The main reason for such a state of affairs is believed to be 
the structure of the Russian economy and its growth model, both of which 
are based on exports of gas, petroleum, and coal – with economic growth 
being possible only when prices of these raw materials are suitably high. As 
a consequence, the current situation of international markets, in particular 
the falling prices of petroleum and gas, must have had a negative impact on 
Russia’s economic potential. 
Russia’s current involvement in the conflict in Ukraine has caused the 
European Union, the United States, and several other countries to impose 
sanctions on Russia. Both experts and the governments of many states believe 
that this mechanism is also having a negative effect on Russia’s GDP (although 
it is difficult to estimate how damaging the effects of the sanctions are). 
Russians themselves have noted the negative effects of the sanctions – 82% 
of respondents expressed they have observed such a trend. More than one-
third (35%) of the respondents believe that the sanctions have contributed to 
a significant deterioration of the situation in Russia. On the other hand, more 
respondents (47%) are convinced that the sanctions have only made things 
marginally worse in Russia. Only one in eight Russians (12%) believes that the 
sanctions have not influenced the Russian economy.
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More than 80% of Russians 
feel that the sanctions 
imposed on Russia have led 
to a deterioration of the 
situation in the country
Those living in Moscow have suffered in particular as a result of the 
sanctions. Half (51%) of the respondents living in the capital declared that 
the sanctions have made the situation significantly worse in Russia, while 
another 43% said that things are slightly worse.
The answers given by the Russian respondents show that regardless of 
how much Russian propaganda has tried to play down the negative effects of 
sanctions on the Russian economy, almost all believe that the 
imposition of these mechanisms has given rise to real problems 
that are affecting not only those in the upper echelons of 
government and society, but also – to a greater or lesser extent 
– the Russian economy as a whole, which in turn is affecting the 
financial wellbeing of Russian households.
In response to the sanctions imposed on Russia, the Kremlin decided to 
introduce “counter sanctions” against the European Union, USA, Canada, 
Australia, and Norway. The list of products covered by the sanctions is mainly 
made up of agricultural and food products. From the very beginning, experts 
predicted that such actions taken by the Russian authorities would not only 
have a negative impact on the economies of the countries against which the 
sanctions were directed, but would also hurt Russia, since national production 
in agricultural and food products is insufficiently developed to allow it to 
completely replace import.
Figure 22. 
How do the Western 
sanctions affect the 
Russian economy? 
Opinions of Russians 
in 2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
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Almost half of Russians (44%) 
believe that the sanctions 
imposed by the Kremlin on 
countries in the West are 
damaging to both Russia and 
the states that they target
Almost half of all Russians (44%) are convinced that the sanctions imposed 
by the Kremlin hurt both Russia and the countries they concern. On the other 
hand, one-third (33%) believe that sanctions hurt only the West, and 12% 
believe that the main victim of such a policy is Russia.
Moreover, there were significant differences between the 
answers given by Moscow residents and other respondents to 
this question. Muscovites are more critical of the effectiveness 
of the sanctions than Russians living in other regions – one-
third of Muscovite respondents (33%) believe that these 
actions are primarily harming Russia itself. Thirty-six percent 
of Muscovites are of the opinion that sanctions are having an 
equally debilitating effect on both Russia and the target countries, while 30% 
believe that it is the Western countries that are mainly suffering as a result 
of this policy. All in all, Russians believe that not only Western sanctions but 
their own government’s retaliation for these sanctions, are hurting Russian 
economy.
Figure 23. 
In response to the 
sanctions imposed 
on Russia by Western 
countries, Russia decided 
to impose counter-
sanctions against the West. 
Who is predominantly 
hurt by these sanctions? 
Opinions of Russians in 
2015 (in %)
Source: Institute of Public 
Affairs/Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2015
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Conclusions
In general, Germans and Poles see the problems and issues surrounding 
the Russia-Ukraine conflict similarly. Opinions on Russia in the two countries 
are closer than many Polish and German commentators might assume, 
even though the percentage breakdown of responses to specific questions 
is not always identical – and sometimes differs significantly. Nevertheless, 
deep internal divisions also exist among the residents of both countries 
and there are no unequivocal answers to these questions. The black-and-
white stereotype of Poles and Germans (anti-Russian Poles and pro-Russian 
Germans) that tends to resurface in discussions on the conflict belies the 
actual diversity of opinion on both sides. This makes it even more difficult 
to find a single key to interpreting the results of the surveys of Polish and 
German public opinion presented here.
Poles and Germans hold similar views when it comes to the state of 
relations between their respective countries and Russia – i.e., they are deemed 
to be poor. Both societies are critical of Russia’s role in the conflict and 
support sanctions against Russia as well as economic aid for Ukraine. In both 
countries there is considerable reluctance to provide Ukraine with military aid 
and there are similar fears of an influx of refugees should the visa requirement 
be waived for Ukrainian citizens. 
Why then do we have this black-and-white presentation of Poles’ and 
Germans’ attitudes? The reason lies in the general differences in the ways in 
which such issues are presented and discussed. Germany and Poland have 
different cultures for resolving conflicts and for debating this issue. The 
atmosphere in discussing the conflict in Poland is far more emotional, while 
in Germany the political rhetoric is decidedly calmer. According to this logic, 
Poles react more vehemently and use more direct, less nuanced language, 
while in Germany, every statement is carefully considered. The same content 
is thus often expressed in different ways in the two countries. As a result, 
interpreting what politicians in Germany and Poland are saying often causes 
difficulties for people who are not following the debate in the neighbouring 
country and are not fully versed in its political culture. Ultimately, many 
a statement made in one or the other country may not entirely reflect reality 
and actual opinions. Myths develop, which in turn undermine trust and give 
rise to fears that we differ fundamentally from each other in our views and 
cannot find a way to work together on this matter.
This does not change the fact that even if the opinions or fears are more 
similar in the two societies than it would seem on the surface, fundamental 
differences are evident when the answers to certain questions are broken 
46 Jacek Kucharczyk, Agnieszka Łada, Gabriele Schöler, Łukasz Wenerski
down. The most significant discrepancies are evident in Poles’ and Germans’ 
perceptions of whether Russia poses a threat, which in turn lead to differing 
opinions on other policy issues regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 
The respondents’ contrasting answers to the survey questions are due 
to a number of factors, the most important of which are the two countries’ 
disparate histories, traditions, and current positions in Europe, as well as 
how the conflict is conveyed and presented in each society. And although 
these reasons may be regarded as obvious, they have negative consequences, 
and therefore they deserve a closer look and an explanation as regards the 
Polish-German and European dialogue on this issue. The two countries have 
contrasting historical perspectives of the territory beyond Poland’s eastern 
border. When referring to Russia, Germans still use language that treats the 
former as if it was its neighbour, even though the two countries have no 
common border. This is because such a way of perceiving Russia was common 
in Germany for centuries in the not too remote past. In addition, Germany is 
convinced that Russia is a country that deserves special treatment because 
of the crimes Germany committed during the Second World War, and also 
because of the fact that the Russians (Soviets) gave permission for German 
reunification. What is not generally considered here is the fact that fighting 
also took place throughout all of present-day Ukraine during WWII and that 
an enormous number of victims of the war and occupation were Ukrainians, 
a fact that Timothy Snyder has pointed out in his writing on many occasions, 
calling modern day Russia’s tendency to ascribe to itself all the losses of 
all the nations making up the former Soviet Union as an “imperialism of 
martyrdom.”13
Russia has never constituted a serious threat to modern-day Germany. In 
turn, Ukraine, in German eyes, exists only as a state that was formed at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The fact that it is a sovereign state only dawned on the 
Germans during the “Orange Revolution” of 2004. For many Germans, Ukraine 
was until recently only a country of “the former Soviet Union” and thus – so 
they presumed – lying within the “Russian sphere of influence.”
Germans are decidedly less interested in the history and present-day 
affairs of their eastern neighbours than Poles are. Poles know more about 
this subject, although it is a knowledge burdened by history and interwoven 
with mythology – not only in relation to Russia, but also regarding Ukraine.14 
Because of their own tragic experiences of Russian aggression and occupation, 
Poles do not trust Russia, and every step taken by the latter that recalls the 
events of the past conjures up negative associations and creates a climate of 
fear. On the one hand, Poles feel a bond with Ukraine – both as a country trying 
to achieve independence in the shadow of its Big Brother and through their 
13 See, for example, T. Snyder, Holocaust: The Ignored Reality, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/
jul/16/holocaust-the-ignored-reality/ [retrie ved: 3.04.2015]
14 The main source of Polish anti-Ukrainian resentment is the so-called Volhynian Massacre of 1943-44 when at 
least 35,000 Poles were murdered by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing.
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many personal contacts with it. On the other hand, the events of the last 20 
years – and their many centuries of common history – have led to a situation 
where Poles sometimes look down on Ukrainians with feelings of superiority. 
And while the pro-democratic revolutionary uprising was close to Poland’s 
heart, the lack of progress made in reforms has irritated many commentators. 
Some Poles also still hold strong anti-Ukrainian prejudices, which Russian 
propaganda is able to exploit. In turn, that fact that they are neighbours 
makes Poles interested in what is going on in Ukraine and motivates them to 
support the latter – although sometimes it is difficult to determine whether 
this is out of feelings of duty, solidarity, or fear that the Ukrainian crisis will 
spill over the border.
The debate in Poland and Germany on Russia, Ukraine, and the Russia-
Ukraine conflict is also being shaped by experts who specialise in Eastern 
policy. There are considerably more of such experts in Poland. Numerous 
opinion-makers in Germany do admittedly express opinions on the subject of 
Russia, but in many cases these are people who are concerned with economic 
cooperation with Russian partners on a day-to-day basis. The Ukraine that is 
presented from a Russian perspective has thus from the outset been dealt a 
weaker hand. Russian propaganda is also paying dividends in Germany. 
Fortunately, many experts – including diplomats and officials responsible 
for mutual relations – are aware of the disparities between Poles and Germans 
that may lead to tensions. This is already the first step towards avoiding Polish-
German misunderstandings. However, the public do not necessarily share this 
awareness, and it is citizens who then put pressure on their political leaders. 
Hence, the key to Polish-German dialogue is the need to be aware of the 
sensitivities, historical experiences, and way of thinking of the other side. It is 
important for Poland and Germany to acquire more in-depth knowledge, both 
about each other and about Russia and Ukraine. In particular, Germany must 
surely find out more about Poland and the countries on its eastern border, 
while Poles need to gain a better understanding of how Germans think.
It is worth analysing the conflict together, treating it as something far 
greater than a local clash between two states lying “in the post-Soviet zone.” 
One platform that could be used in both cases would be joint debates in the 
media. In particular, German experts could be invited to Polish media outlets 
and their Polish counterparts to the German media (language barriers should 
not be a problem here as a sufficiently large number of experts have mastered 
the language of their neighbour). In the German case, it is important to 
promote tendencies that are only now beginning to germinate, i.e., giving a 
voice not only to experts with affiliations with Russia, but also to those who 
understand both Russia and Ukraine. In the case of the Polish media, on the 
other hand, efforts should be made to increase the currently exceptionally 
small number of Polish correspondents in Germany, because otherwise it is 
difficult to report and comment on debates and opinions there which, after 
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all, do not only involve the Eastern policy. Journalists from both countries 
should be sent on joint study visits and the Eastern policy should be made 
a topic for meetings between young people. Moreover, Polish institutions 
should consider sending Polish experts to Berlin research institutions to 
foster continuous dialogue and make sure Poland has a voice there. Germans, 
in turn, could invite a Polish analyst to help them set up a new research centre 
for Eastern Europe – preliminary steps have already been taken to establish 
such a centre. Both sides should also consider together what actions can be 
taken to combat the ubiquitous Russian propaganda.
The politicians of both countries should also not neglect dialogue with their 
own populations, so that they understand and accept the political line being 
taken on the conflict. One example here would be the issue of waiving visas for 
Ukrainians. This process is very advanced, and liberalising the visa regime would 
send a clear signal to Ukrainians that the EU treats their European aspirations 
and commitment seriously. However, a sizeable portion of the Polish public and 
an even greater number of Germans need convincing on this issue.  
The survey also sends out a clear signal that Poland and Germany are bound 
to work together on developing a European Eastern policy. Both capitals have 
an opportunity to obtain the support of other EU states for joint ideas and to 
act in the name and for the good of the European Union as a whole.
When considering such joint action in the west it is important to bear in 
mind the results of the survey in Russia, which shows that Russian society, 
despite the constant barrage of propaganda, is also conscious of at least some 
of the consequences of the conflict. Russians see how relations with Germany 
and Poland have deteriorated sharply and are feeling the burden of the 
sanctions imposed by the West as well as the counter-sanctions introduced 
by the Kremlin. The survey also shows that Germany and Poland are not 
perceived by Russians as a threat. Rather, they see the United States as the 
primary antagonist. Undoubtedly, the influence of the many years of intense 
anti-American propaganda can be seen here.
To be sure, the most important result of the survey concerns Russia’s 
involvement in the conflict in East Ukraine. The largest group of respondents 
want Russia to remain neutral and not get involved in the war. Among 
those respondents who support the idea of Russia intervening to help the 
separatists, only a small minority were in favour of sending Russian soldiers to 
the Ukraine, which as we know has been going on for many months. Together, 
a mere 7% of respondents back the direct involvement of Russian armed forces 
in the fighting.  This is a clear negation, even if only indirectly (officially, the 
Russian government denies that Russian armed forces are playing any part in 
the conflict in the Donbas region), of the Kremlin’s aggressive policy. This fact 
casts the belief that Putin’s policy enjoys the support of the vast majority of 
the Russian public in a different light, and thus may offer hope that Russia and 
the West are not on an inevitable path towards conflict.
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